The forgotten birthday. What August 16th really reveals about Cyprus – and about Moscow's role.

Opening lines: Today is August 16th . For most news agencies, a day like any other, but for Cyprus, one with a double meaning: in 1960 , a unified state was born here at midnight; in 1974, on the same date, the ceasefire came into effect that still divides the island today. We took a closer look at the day – and rediscovered a third story, one that is missing from most retrospectives: that of the Soviet Union .

Driving through hot Cyprus today, hardly anyone thinks about 1960. The flags, commemorative plaques, and conversations in the cafes revolve almost exclusively around 1974. Yet, the truly interesting question lies precisely in between: How did a state that was supposed to belong jointly to both ethnic groups collapse within just fourteen years – and which major power was pulling the strings behind the scenes, a power that is hardly ever mentioned today?

1960: One state for two communities

On the night of August 16, 1960, British colonial rule over Cyprus ended . The new republic was founded on the Zurich and London Agreements. Archbishop Makarios III became president, and the Turkish Cypriot Fazıl Küçük vice president.

The Turkish Cypriot community was not an ordinary minority, but an equal partner in the constitution – with fixed shares in parliament, administration and the police.

Three states also assumed a guarantor role : Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. They were to protect Cyprus's independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order. At the same time, they were to prevent Cyprus from either being united with Greece – Enosis – or partitioned between Greece and Turkey – Taksim .

London never fully withdrew. The military bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia remained British territory and remain so to this day. Nevertheless, this continuing British responsibility is addressed far less frequently in the public narrative than Turkey's role. Cyprus conflict – Wikipedia, on the guarantor powers

Moscow is involved

The simplistic explanation that the Soviet Union simply supported Enosis in the 1950s is too simplistic.

Indeed, Moscow repeatedly supported the Greek demand for self-determination for the Cypriot population at the United Nations. This was driven by anti-colonial convictions, but also by geopolitical calculation: the conflict weakened the cohesion of the NATO partners Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain and put pressure on London in a strategically important colony. This is described, among other things, by the historian Marios Tasoulas in his study of Greek-Soviet relations from 1956 to 1960. (Tasoulas: The Role of the Cyprus Issue in Greek-Soviet Relations 1956–1960, RUDN Journal)

The Soviet position on Enosis remained contradictory. A Cyprus united with Greece would ultimately have become part of a NATO member state. For Moscow, therefore, the outcome of Enosis was not necessarily decisive, but rather the conflict that the demand triggered within the Western alliance. TASAM: The Cyprus Issue in USSR–Turkish Republic Relations

With independence in 1960, the Soviet priority shifted. A free, non-aligned Cyprus without Western military ties became more attractive to Moscow than union with Greece. Makarios maintained close relations with the Soviet Union, Cyprus joined the Non-Aligned Movement, and with AKEL, the island possessed one of the most influential communist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.

Olgun's thesis: Cyprus as the "Cuba of the Mediterranean"

Former Turkish Cypriot negotiator Mustafa Ergün Olgun devotes particular attention to the Soviet role in his 2025 book *Betrayal – The Other Side of the Cyprus Case*. Olgun is not an uninvolved voice: he experienced the Cyprus conflict firsthand, was wounded in the process, and later served in leading negotiating roles under Rauf Denktash, Derviş Eroğlu, and Ersin Tatar. A review in the Cyprus Mail accordingly contextualizes his book as one of several deliberately diverse perspectives on the conflict—not as a neutral, comprehensive account. Cyprus Mail: Cyprus has no shortage of histories, contextualization of Olgun and his book

His focus is not on Soviet planning for the later division. Rather, he examines how Moscow strengthened the Greek Cypriot leadership during the crisis of 1963/64.

According to Olgun, Makarios relied on political and military support from the Soviet Union and from Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Moscow saw in a Greek Cypriot-dominated state an opportunity to expand its influence through the powerful communist AKEL, exacerbate tensions within NATO, and gain a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In his book, Olgun describes an assurance given by the Soviet ambassador in February 1964, as well as the landing of Soviet weapons via Egypt – according to his account, by three Russian ships on February 23, 1964, in the port of Famagusta.

Other archive-based research also confirms Olgun's statements. Czechoslovakian arms shipments to Makarios were described precisely during this period. The Soviet Union, through its fraternal state of Czechoslovakia, played a significant role in keeping Makarios in power by supplying him with weapons, thus enabling him to build up special police forces as a counterweight to the Greek-controlled National Guard. (See Bešta: Czechoslovakia and the 'Cyprus issue' 1960–1974, Middle Eastern Studies and Mustafa Ergün Olgun: *Betrayal – The Other Side of the Cyprus Case.)

According to Olgun's interpretation, this support boosted the confidence of Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership. At the same time, declassified US documents, independent of Olgun's account, confirm that concerns were growing in Washington and London that a victory for Makarios would strengthen the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and that of the communists in Cyprus, bordering on the fear of a "Cuba of the Mediterranean," even though this term itself originates from Olgun's book.

In the final chapter, Olgun formulates his thesis particularly sharply: Makarios, in alliance with the Soviet Union, used the opportunity to turn Cyprus into a "Cuba of the Mediterranean" if the West did not accept the order that had emerged after the collapse of the common government structure.

Olgun directly links this situation to UN Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964. The resolution created the basis for the UN peacekeeping force UNFICYP and treated the then exclusively Greek Cypriot-led administration practically as the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

From a Turkish Cypriot perspective, this had a serious consequence: Turkish Cypriots lost their international status as equal founding partners and increasingly appeared only as a community within a Greek Cypriot-represented state.

Olgun's central thesis is therefore: The Western powers wanted to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey, protect NATO's southeastern flank, and avoid a stronger Soviet presence in Cyprus. Under this pressure, a decision was reached that permanently shifted the balance of power on the island in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.

This interpretation is controversial. However, it reveals how closely the internal Cypriot constitutional conflict was linked to the fears and interests of the Cold War.

No architect of the division

The Soviet Union was therefore not a minor player. However, it cannot be described as the secret architect of the geographical division of 1974 either.

Moscow initially strengthened Makarios and the Greek Cypriot power position because a non-aligned and pro-Soviet Cyprus suited its interests. When the Greek military junta supported the 1974 coup against Makarios in order to forcibly impose Enosis, the Soviet Union opposed this plan and officially defended the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Moscow reacted with remarkable restraint to the subsequent Turkish military operation. A scholarly study by John Sakkas and Natalya Zhukova describes this Soviet self-restraint and concludes that Moscow tolerated Turkish policy, at least temporarily, for geopolitical reasons. Sakkas/Zhukova: The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967–1974, Cairn.info

The resulting division weakened NATO's southeastern flank and deepened the conflict between Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union had not demonstrably planned the division, but was able to derive strategic benefits from its consequences .

How 1974 overshadowed the common beginning

The order of 1960 lasted only until 1963. The common government structure broke apart, leading to inter-communal violence, murder and expulsion, and finally to the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force.

In July 1974, the military junta in Athens supported the coup against Makarios. Turkey intervened, invoking the guarantee treaty. On August 14, the second offensive began, and two days later a ceasefire came into effect. Turkish troops then controlled approximately 37 percent of the island. bpb.de : The partition of Cyprus – a never-ending conflict?

For Greek Cypriots, 1974 still represents invasion, displacement, and loss of property. For Turkish Cypriots, the intervention is largely seen as a protective and peacekeeping operation.

Both sides remember the same date – just from opposite perspectives. August 16, 1960, is increasingly being forgotten because the founding of the state brings to mind a fact inconvenient for both narratives: the Republic of Cyprus was originally intended as a single state .

A date disappears

The Republic of Cyprus officially celebrates its independence not on August 16th, but on October 1st. The date was changed in the early 1960s, partly due to summer heat and the holiday season.

The actual birthday thus lost its visibility. At the same time, the same day acquired a second, considerably more painful meaning through the 1974 armistice.

The trauma of the division has overshadowed the memory of the joint founding.

Russia today: less influence, still veto power

Of Moscow's former influence, primarily institutional power remains today. Greece is firmly anchored in NATO and the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus has also become more Western-oriented and has supported the European sanctions against Russia since 2022.

Olgun points out that the Russian navy previously had access to facilities in the port of Limassol. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, the sanctions, and the closer military cooperation between the Republic of Cyprus and the United States, this possibility has ceased. He explicitly leaves open the question of whether this will lead to a permanent shift in Moscow's stance towards the Greek Cypriot side.

Russia has therefore not disappeared from the Cyprus conflict. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it still possesses veto power – relevant for resolutions concerning UNFICYP and for the international safeguarding of a potential peace settlement.

However, its former operational power to shape policy in Cyprus and Greece has diminished significantly. Russia can still block decisions, but its ability to shape policy is considerably reduced.

One day, two almost forgotten stories

The year 1960 tells of a difficult beginning together, the year 1974 of its failure. In between stands a major power that never occupied Cyprus, but used the island for decades as a stage for systemic rivalry.

The suffering caused by the expulsions on both sides is not diminished by this geopolitical perspective. But those who think only of 1974 easily overlook the fact that there was a moment in 1960 when this island was meant to belong to both communities jointly.

And those who only look at Greece, Turkey and Great Britain overlook a fourth force: the Soviet Union, whose support for Makarios, whose influence on Western security thinking and whose role in the UN Security Council helped to shape the political development of the island.

We'll keep you posted.

All love,

Samira & Marten

Sources

- Mustafa Ergün Olgun: *Betrayal – The Other Side of the Cyprus Case. An Account of the Cyprus Issue and the UN Facilitated Settlement Process from 1960 to 2025*. Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature, 2025, especially Chapter 3, pages 26–29 and 36–37, and Chapter 22, pages 633–635. [DOI and publisher's edition](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-95742-0)

- [Cyprus Mail: Cyprus has no shortage of histories – Olgun and his book are considered one of several perspectives](https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/06/21/cyprus-has-no-shortage-of-histories)

- [Bešta: Czechoslovakia and the 'Cyprus issue' in the years 1960–1974, Middle Eastern Studies – independent, archive-based classification of Eastern Bloc arms deliveries](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263206.2020.1860944)

- [Marios Tasoulas: The Role of the Cyprus Issue in Greek-Soviet Relations 1956–1960, RUDN Journal](https://journals.rudn.ru/international-relations/article/view/25963)

- [TASAM: The Cyprus Issue in USSR–Turkish Republic Relations](https://tasam.org/en/Icerik/72629/the_cyprus_issue_in_the_ussr-turkish_republic_relations)

- [John Sakkas/Natalya Zhukova: The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967–1974](https://shs.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-irice-2013-1-page-123?lang=en)

- [Federal Agency for Civic Education: Division of Cyprus – a never-ending conflict?](https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/188336/teilung-zyperns-ein-nicht-endender-konflikt/)

- [Cyprus conflict – Overview of guarantor powers and development](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zypernkonflikt)