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Cyprus's gas fields: Why the Republic of Cyprus suddenly needs the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus


Sometimes the future of a country is not where you look first.

When we think of Cyprus, we often look at the border, the buffer zone, old houses, abandoned villages, and the political rhetoric that has been circulating through negotiations for decades: federation, two states, guarantees, security, equality. All of this remains important because behind it lie real people, real wounds, and real memories.


But these days, part of the future also lies beneath the sea.



Several gas fields have been discovered off the coast of Cyprus in recent years. The best known is Aphrodite in Block 12, south of the island; the discovery was announced in late 2011 and is located close to Israeli structures such as the Yishai field. Later discoveries included Calypso in Block 6, Glaucus in Block 10, Cronos and Zeus in other southern sea areas, and most recently Pegasus, also in Block 10, about 190 kilometers southwest of Cyprus. AP reported that ExxonMobil and QatarEnergy estimate the combined gas reserves of Glaucus and Pegasus at about seven trillion cubic feet and anticipate a possible start of production around 2033. AP: Cypriot natural gas could start flowing from ExxonMobil's discoveries by 2033


This means that the Cyprus question is no longer just a matter of history and identity. It is also a matter of mining rights, investments, pipelines, security, and European energy supply.



The simple map: Who is allowed to provide funding?


Legally, the Republic of Cyprus holds the strongest position. It is the internationally recognized state on the island, a member of the European Union, and it grants licenses within its exclusive economic zone. On this basis, international energy companies such as ExxonMobil, Qatar Energy, Chevron, Shell, Eni, Total Energies, and NewMed are working on Cypriot offshore projects.


For the average reader, it can be put like this: Southern Cyprus has the internationally recognized documents, the EU provides political support, Israel is directly affected because of adjacent fields and possible export routes, and American companies with large amounts of capital are at the table.


This is precisely where the major economic logic arises. As these fields are developed, the companies that bear the risk and bring the technology will profit first. Subsequently, the Republic of Cyprus gains revenue, importance, and political weight. Israel can benefit through its proximity to the EU, security, and regional energy relations. The EU gains another building block to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. The US is involved because American corporations are investing, and Washington has an interest in maintaining stability in the energy landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean.


Since the war between Russia and Ukraine, Europe has been urgently seeking broader sources of gas and more stable supply routes. The EU wants to gradually end Russian gas imports; AP reported on the plan to halt Russian natural gas imports by the end of 2027. AP: EU seeks to halt Russian gas imports by the end of 2027

The gas off Cyprus won't replace Russia on its own. The quantities, routes, and timelines are too limited for that. But it fits into a larger European goal: more suppliers, more routes, more security.



The complicated map: Who can cause problems?


Turkey does not have the same internationally recognized legal position as the Republic of Cyprus regarding these offshore licenses issued by Nicosia. Ankara does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the sole representative of the entire island and argues that Turkish Cypriots also have rights to the natural resources surrounding Cyprus.


Northern Cyprus itself cannot license such gas fields on an equal international footing because the TRNC is only recognized by Turkey. Nevertheless, Northern Cyprus is the political lever through which Ankara argues: without the Turkish Cypriots, there can be no fair and stable order.


Herein lies the crux of the problem. The Republic of Cyprus can grant the rights, but Turkey can increase the risk and costs. Through naval presence, political warnings, its own explorations, disputes over maritime zones, or pressure on routes, it can make a project significantly more expensive and uncertain for investors. In 2018, a drillship used by Eni was blocked by a Turkish naval presence en route to work off Cyprus. This incident demonstrates that operational power is sometimes enough to effectively thwart legal claims. Overview of the Cyprus-Turkey dispute over maritime zones and drilling activities


This issue is particularly sensitive with gas because the infrastructure is vulnerable. A gas field requires drilling, platforms, pipelines, insurance, financing, long-term offtake agreements, and political stability. A pipeline is not an abstract concept but a concrete structure above or below the sea. If a state or other actor so desires, such infrastructure can be disrupted, threatened, or politically blocked. Europe has learned through the development of gas supplies from Russia just how vulnerable energy dependencies and pipelines can become when politics and security of supply diverge.


This is crucial for energy companies. A field may contain vast amounts of gas, but as long as the risk is too high, they remain cautious about investing. Companies only invest billions if they can assume that drilling, transport routes, and contracts will remain protected for many years.



Why America and Turkey belong together here


The US is involved in this issue on two levels. On the economic level, it concerns companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron. If American corporations are to conduct development off the coast of Cyprus, Washington needs an environment in which these investments are not constantly jeopardized by crises. This does not mean that the US government controls every corporate decision. But it does mean that major energy projects and American foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean are inextricably linked.


At the strategic level, the issue revolves around Turkey. Washington does not want to lose Ankara from the Western alliance system. The current debate surrounding the F-35, sanctions, and the rapprochement between Trump and Erdoğan fits into this picture. AP reported, in connection with the NATO summit in Ankara, that Trump announced the lifting of sanctions against Turkey, which could pave the way for F-35 sales. AP: Trump meets NATO leaders in Turkey. The New York Post also reported on the easing of defense sanctions and a possible return of Turkey to the F-35 program. New York Post: Trump lifting defense sanctions on Turkey


This rapprochement is not a story of friendship, even if Trump and Erdoğan like to portray themselves publicly as trusted partners. It is a matter of self-interest. Turkey wants to be strengthened militarily and politically, the US wants to keep Turkey in the Western camp, Israel is closely monitoring a stronger Turkey, and Europe needs calm in the eastern Mediterranean if gas fields and export routes are to be developed.


This creates a potential exchange logic that no one needs to explicitly state: greater integration of Turkey into the Western security framework, in return for less potential for disruption in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whether this is being negotiated is unproven. However, as an analysis, it is plausible because the interests point precisely in this direction.



The interests in one sentence


The Republic of Cyprus intends to use its recognized rights and gain revenue, security, and political clout from the finds.


The EU wants additional gas sources so that Europe remains less dependent on Russia.


The US wants stable investment conditions for American companies and at the same time a Türkiye that does not drift too far out of the Western alliance.


Israel wants a secure neighborhood, clear rules around adjacent fields like Aphrodite/Yishai, and reliable regional energy partners.


Turkey wants to prevent itself and the Turkish Cypriots from being excluded from a new energy order on its own doorstep.


Northern Cyprus does not just want to be involved later, but wants to be perceived today as a political part of this future.



Why this can lead to a new willingness to find solutions


From an investor's perspective, the Cyprus issue is not a historical seminar, but a risk. As long as the island remains politically unresolved and Turkey can interpret any major project as an attempt to marginalize Turkish Cypriots, drilling, pipelines, and export routes will remain vulnerable.


From the EU's perspective, the situation is similar. Europe needs not just gas, but reliable gas. A source located in the sea, but one that can be constantly blocked politically, is less valuable than a source embedded in a stable regional order.

That is precisely why the gas issue can bring movement to the Cyprus question. Not because all old grievances would suddenly disappear, but because economic and strategic interests make a solution more useful than stagnation.


This also raises the question of a new Cypriot architecture from a different perspective. For decades, negotiations have primarily focused on the past: What happened in 1974? Who owns which house? Who lost which rights? Who owes whom something in return or as a guarantee? These questions remain significant on both a human and legal level. But so far, they haven't sufficiently compelled the south to take real action. The Republic of Cyprus was internationally recognized, a member of the EU, and legally in a stronger position. It could afford to wait.


The gas issue is changing this sense of security. If Southern Cyprus wants not only to grant its exploration rights but also to exploit them under the best possible conditions, it needs not only legal recognition but also political stability. A company will pay more, invest more boldly, and commit to longer-term contracts if it can assume that drilling, pipelines, and export routes will not be constantly jeopardized by the unresolved conflict. From this perspective, Turkish Cypriots are suddenly no longer seen merely as an unresolved political problem, but as part of the stability that the south itself needs to secure the best gas deal.


This is a new form of equality. Not because both sides suddenly have the same international legal standing. They don't. But because the economic value of the southern Cypriot rights depends on whether a solution is found with the north that sufficiently involves or reassures Ankara. The south possesses the recognized licenses, but the north and Turkey hold the key to mitigating the risks. Only together can the best price be achieved.


Two things could now happen.

The best approach would be a renewed willingness to fairly share future resources with Turkish Cypriots without jeopardizing the international legal standing of the Republic of Cyprus. This could be achieved through revenue mechanisms, trust models, security guarantees, or a new political formula that is not yet finalized. Such a solution would provide security for investors, open up new energy options for the EU, and demonstrate to the island's inhabitants that gas is not solely for the benefit of large corporations.


The worst outcome would be an even deeper division. Southern Cyprus, the EU, Israel, and American companies would then continue planning their projects without the north, while Turkey would bind the north more closely to itself and view every project as part of a power struggle. In this case, the gas would still be in the sea, but its development would remain expensive, slow, and politically precarious.


That's why the gas off Cyprus is so important. It doesn't automatically resolve the conflict, but it changes the equation. Suddenly, inaction costs not only trust, but also a great deal of money.


Perhaps that's precisely why so many cards are on the table again these days. The Cyprus question hasn't become any simpler. But it has become more practical. Anyone who wants to extract, sell, and transport gas to Europe needs more than drilling technology. They need an order in which everyone feels powerful enough not to constantly cause disruption.


And perhaps, despite the harshness of these interests, there lies a small opportunity.

If there is a common value beneath the sea, then at some point a common form must be found above the sea.


All love

Samira & Marten


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