What game theory might have to do with Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus

Sometimes a fresh perspective helps to see an old topic in a new light.

In recent months, the name Jiang Xueqin has repeatedly surfaced in international discourse. He is a Chinese-Canadian teacher, author, and public thinker who combines historical patterns, game theory, and geopolitical analysis under the umbrella of Predictive History . Media outlets such as The Business Standard describe him as someone who reads international conflicts less morally and more strategically: Who are the players? What interests do they have? What constraints limit their decisions? Which historical patterns repeat themselves? Jiang himself doesn't work like a traditional news analyst, but rather as an interpreter of power games, empires, overextension, and misjudgments. His theses are partly speculative and should therefore not be considered definitive predictions. What is interesting, however, is his perspective: He doesn't first ask what actors say publicly, but rather what game structure underlies their actions. (The Business Standard , Jiang Lens)

This perspective could be helpful for Cyprus.

The Cyprus question is often framed as a historical or legal dispute. The north speaks of protection, security, and political equality. The south speaks of occupation, sovereignty, property rights, and international law. Turkey speaks of guarantees, strategic depth, and the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Greece stands with the Republic of Cyprus. The EU defends its legal framework. The US focuses on NATO, Turkey, Israel, energy, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain remains part of the security architecture through its Sovereign Base Areas. Israel considers gas, shipping lanes, and regional stability.

All of that is correct.

But if you look at it from a game-theoretical perspective, you ask a slightly different question.

Then the question is not just: Who is right?

Then it reads: Who needs what to be able to move around?

The Cyprus question as a game with many players

In a simple argument, there are two sides.

Cyprus is not a simple dispute.

There is at least the north, the south, Turkey, Greece, the EU, the UN, Great Britain, the USA, and Israel. In addition, there is Russia, regional energy companies, investors, property owners, displaced persons, students, tourists, emigrants, and the people who live on this island every day.

Each of these actors has different interests.

The south wants to secure its international recognition, its EU membership, and its sovereignty. It wants to prevent the Turkish side from creating a new reality through de facto actions that will be difficult to reverse later.

The North wants to break out of its isolation. It doesn't want to be merely administered, but to be seen. It seeks political equality, economic openness, security of supply, and the feeling of not being pushed back into a system where its voice can be drowned out.

Turkey wants to protect the north, maintain its role in the eastern Mediterranean, act as an energy hub, and prevent Cyprus from becoming a purely Greek-European outpost.

The EU wants stability, legal certainty, energy supply, controlled migration and a Turkey that does not completely fall out of the Western order.

The US wants to keep Turkey in NATO, secure Israel, regulate energy routes and remain capable of action in the eastern Mediterranean.

Reading this, one quickly realizes: Neither side can simply disappear. Neither side can win completely. And neither side can permanently pretend to be able to completely ignore the interests of the other.

Why stagnation is sometimes rational

This is perhaps one of the most uncomfortable insights of game theory: stagnation can be rational for individual players, even if it is bad for everyone together.

For a long time, the south had little incentive to make significant changes. It was internationally recognized, a member of the EU, and could legally maintain the status quo better than the north.

The North had little incentive to return to a process that could ultimately lead to an order in which political equality is promised but not adequately guaranteed in practice.

Turkey had little incentive to relinquish its protective role as long as it did not receive an equivalent security architecture.

The EU had little incentive to openly rethink the problem as long as the status quo remained manageable.

This creates a balance that doesn't really make anyone happy, but appears less risky in the short term to many players than movement.

Such a balance feels like political stagnation.

From a game theory perspective, it is a blocked game.

Why the current topic of "energy" is changing the game

Now energy is added.

The gas fields around Cyprus, the planned natural gas pipeline from Turkey to Northern Cyprus, the electricity storage plans in the south, and possible connections to Europe, Israel, Egypt and Turkey are changing the structure.

Suddenly, it's not just about memory and law.

It's about money, supplies, investments, infrastructure, and pathways to the market.

The southern region enjoys international recognition and can issue legally valid licenses within the framework of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. However, the development of the gas fields requires security, investment protection, stable transport routes, and political stability.

The north does not have this international recognition, but is geographically and strategically located in a position that is very important for Turkey and potential energy routes.

Turkey does not possess the internationally recognized Cypriot mining rights, but can operationally disrupt, block, protect, offer, or create alternative routes.

The US and Israel have an interest in ensuring that energy in the eastern Mediterranean does not remain permanently trapped in an unresolved conflict zone.

That changes the incentives.

The status quo will become more expensive.

And it is precisely at this point that progress could be made.

Cyprus as a small board in the big American game

At this point, the Cyprus question touches upon Jiang's larger thesis about the decline of the USA.

In his view, the decline of an empire is not only evident where it disappears. It is also evident where it is still present but can no longer simply maintain order.

That's exactly how one could read Cyprus.

The US remains important in the Eastern Mediterranean. It hasn't disappeared. It has influence through NATO, Israel, energy companies, security architecture, diplomacy, and its relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. But it can no longer simply dictate a clear order that everyone else must follow.

They need Israel, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, stable energy supply chains, and an EU that remains capable of action. At the same time, they need a Turkey that doesn't drift too far towards Russia, China, or the BRICS countries.

This is a game with too many boards.

For Jiang, this would be a sign of imperial overextension : The hegemon is still strong, but his strength is no longer sufficient to resolve all contradictions. He must balance and negotiate. He must now take seriously those actors who were previously treated as subordinate players.

Turkey is a good example of this. It cannot simply be ignored. It is a NATO member, controls access to the Black Sea, and is important for migration, energy, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the connection between Europe and Asia. While it does not possess the internationally recognized mining rights of the Republic of Cyprus, it does have operational power. It can disrupt, protect, offer, block, or open pathways.

In this logic, Northern Cyprus becomes a small but important touchstone.

The official Western order states: The Republic of Cyprus is the recognized state, and the solution should be found within the UN framework. Operational reality, however, dictates that a stable energy, security, and peace order cannot be established in the Eastern Mediterranean without Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side. It is precisely in this gap between official order and practical power that movement is emerging.

This doesn't mean the US will collapse because Cyprus remains unresolved. That would be far too sweeping. But Cyprus illustrates on a small scale what Jiang describes on a larger one: the American-led order can no longer impose its preferred solution on its own. It must work with actors who possess their own leverage.

The decline is therefore not manifesting as an immediate retreat. It is manifesting as the need for negotiations. That is what we are experiencing now.

And perhaps this very pressure to negotiate is even an opportunity for Cyprus. Because if the US, the EU, and the region recognize that the north and Turkey can no longer simply be managed as a problem, but must be part of a viable solution, the old game plan could change.

What could one deduce from this?

Applying Jiang's way of thinking to Cyprus leads to a simple yet crucial insight: a solution is unlikely to emerge simply because one side suddenly adopts the other's narrative. Rather, it arises when interests shift in such a way that cooperation becomes more beneficial to all parties than obstruction. This is not a romantic notion, but it can have a peaceful effect.

Peace doesn't have to mean everyone tells the same story. Perhaps it's enough, at least initially, if everyone recognizes that their future will be better if they allow a new, shared order.

For the south, this could mean that its own international recognition and EU integration will not be weakened, but rather become more valuable if they lead to a common island architecture.

For the north , this could mean that equality is not only formulated as a political promise, but practically secured through its own administration, participation in energy revenues, protective rights, infrastructure and direct participation.

For Turkey, this could mean that it does not lose its influence, but gains a legal, economic and strategic bridge into a European context.

For the EU , this could mean: It gains more stability in the eastern Mediterranean without completely excluding Turkey.

For Greece, this could mean that the old conflict line with Turkey is defused at a particularly sensitive point.

For Israel and the USA , this could mean: energy, security and regional order will become more predictable.

Game-Theoretical Conclusion for Cyprus

Game theory currently points neither toward full reunification nor toward the international recognition of two sovereign states. However, as the geopolitical framework changes, the status quo that remained stable for decades is gradually losing its attractiveness for several actors. This increases the likelihood of a new equilibrium that at least partially takes the core interests of all sides into account.

The most likely first step appears to be a gradual economic and legal rapprochement between North Cyprus and the European Union, combined with growing institutional cooperation. In the long term, this could develop into a highly decentralized federal or federal-confederal order: one internationally recognized state with two largely self-governing constituent parts, a shared European legal framework, and limited common institutions.

Such a model would not give any actor a complete victory. Yet it could become the first stable cooperative equilibrium in which no side has to give up its core security and identity interests. From a game-theoretical perspective, this is where the greatest current opportunity for a sustainable solution to the Cyprus question may lie.

And sometimes peace begins when someone has the courage to redraw the game.

With love,

Samira & Marten